HOW TO WIN a lasting peace?

Ukraine and the world after the guns fall silent
On Andrei Sakharov

Andrei Sakharov was a man of powerful ethical potential, which obviously outweighed ideological or ethnic motivations in him. It was this fact that we, former Ukrainian political prisoners, drew the attention of the deputies of the Ivano-Frankivsk City Council when in April 2022 they announced their intention to rename Andrei Sakharov Street on the grounds that he was a Russian. I quote our appeal. “Today, referring to the now historical documents, letters, appeals, interviews, we see how the great citizen Andrei Sakharov constantly and actively defended the rights of Ukrainian political prisoners, including Vasyl Stus and many others. It was we, Ukrainian citizens of different ethnic origins, who were most often mentioned in his speeches and written documents. We are sure that if Andrey Dmitrievich were alive, he would be with us, with Ukraine, and not with the criminal Putin. […]

Today, the political scenery has changed and even a new war has broken out. But the struggle of good and evil remains eternal as the world. I am happy that today it is the Ukrainian people who have resolutely taken the side of good and are paying a high price for it. I am grateful to the organizers of the 13th International Sakharov Conference for dedicating it to the sacrificial struggle of Ukraine for freedom and independence.

Miroslav Marinovich,
Soviet dissident and former political prisoner
Introduction

The Thirteenth International Sakharov Conference, organized in Vilnius on May 18-19, 2023, was fully dedicated to post-war Ukraine. Although it might seem strange to organize such a conference while the war of Russian aggression against its neighbor was in full swing and it was neither certain what the outcome of the war will be, nor when it will end, we believed it could not be too early to start thinking about the post-war challenges. Every day that we don’t think about this was in our view a lost day, for which Ukraine will pay later.

More than a year of war has destroyed a considerable part of the country, has made the economy totally dependent on external financial support, has rid the country - at least temporary - of many of its professionals, without the certainty that they will come back, and has created a multitude of new problems that will seriously impede the reconstruction process after the war. And at the same time, we should not forget that there is still a possibility that the end result will be a hybrid war that will last many years if not decades, which will frustrate any attempt to pull the country out of the current...
And while we know all this, we also should not forget that when it entered this imposed war, Ukraine was in fact in many respects still a post-Soviet and post-totalitarian country, and had a long road ahead to become a country truly based on the rule of law.

In the public discourse it is usually the issue of corruption that dominates. Yet, though being extremely important, it is in my view certainly not the only crucial issue ahead. Four big issues are the main topics of this conference, and were discussed in depth during the first public day. During the second day, behind closed doors and under Chatham House Rule, four working groups consisting of panel members and added experts continued the deliberations, which eventually led to this document outlining the most pressing issues and ideas how to tackle them in the years and decades to come.

Ukraine will have to be rebuilt, yet it is important that the reconstruction of the country will not be an attempt to return to the old, but rather one of seeing the crisis as an opportunity to take a leap forward, Building Back Better. The needs of the population will require speed, yet speed is also a bad advisor to quality.

The environmental consequences of the war will be enormous and will have to be dealt with, yet this provides also an opportunity to take a huge step forward by introducing environment-friendly measures in building, energy and nature preservation.

The psychological consequences are beyond imagination. As you know, my field of expertise is mental health, and when I imagine the work ahead of us, I have sleepless nights... How many of the hundreds of thousands of men who fought at the front will be able to resume their previous lives without serious problems, how many will need specialized care, and how many will have inroads with the law because of crimes committed as a result of war-time experiences?

And at the same time, how will the millions of women who fled the country with their children manage to resume their previous relationships, when they have learned to manage their lives independently and often in countries with a far greater equality between the sexes, and when - to make things worse - a large number of their husbands have been altered by the horrors of war?

There are so many questions, and so many issues, and when opening the pandora box so many new ones appear – yet there is no possibility not to address them, one by one, and to find solutions, if not now than in the future.

Ukraine has a lot to gain, paid for with the blood of hundreds of thousands of its citizens, both military and civilian. But it also has a lot to lose. And it could win the war and still lose it, when it fails to establish a democratic state based on the rule of law, on basis of the concept of freedom and equality, and when it fails to show the absolute difference between a totalitarian criminal Russian state and a democratic Ukrainian society.

And that risk is real, alas, because in times of war it is easier to focus on small things, on radical steps with high visibility, rather than on the very fundamental and structural issues that the country will have to face for generations to come. And if it would lose this second “war”, this war against simplistic radicalism, it is still possible that as a result Putin and his cronies win their war, even if their country is destroyed as well. It follows the logic of Adolf Hitler: if we don't win, nobody should win and everything should be destroyed.

So our desire was to organize a conference that would focus on these crucial issues, and to find ways to help Ukraine to win this war – not only now but also after the military victory, and to bring the country into its rightful place – as a crucial, vibrant and strong part of a democratic, free Europe based on equality, respect and compassion.

This report provides you with a detailed overview of the discussions at the Thirteenth International Sakharov Conference. As indicated earlier, the conference took place in the course of two days, the first day being public and the second behind closed doors. During the opening session we had contributions from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Lithuania, from Vytautas Magnus University and Ukrainian former political prisoner Myroslav Marynovich, pro-rektor of the Chatholic University in Lviv.
Session I: Democracy and the Rule of Law: Steps Towards a Sustainable Victory for Ukraine

In November 2013, protests began in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti square in response to then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to suspend talks with the European Union in favor of closer ties with Russia. With these protests, Ukrainian national identity was reborn, closely intertwined with the core values of human dignity, democracy and the rule of law. In the following years, the world witnessed the strength of Ukrainian civil society as international organizations reported significant progress in Ukraine’s electoral procedures, political rights and civil liberties, and important reforms were started with the goal of bringing the country closer to the EU standards of the rule of law. Nevertheless, Ukraine still faced internal and external challenges, such as widespread corruption, shortcomings in the Ukrainian judicial system, personalization of political parties, ongoing armed conflict in several regions with Russia-sponsored armed groups, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and complexities of EU and NATO memberships.

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the aggressor state of Russia in late February of 2022, these challenges have been exacerbated and joined by new ones. Gaining and retaining external support, establishing a system of criminal justice accountability, protecting numerous victims of human rights abuses and defeating the aggressor’s forces with the least possible casualties became the top priorities.
In the context of such challenges, rule of law becomes a fundamental principle on which to orientate. Justice for victims, accountability, membership in international organizations and many other issues need to be based on the principle of equality under the same laws for everyone in a country or a community. And since the 24th of February of 2022, not just Ukraine, but the whole international community is facing the same common threat to the rule of law – the aggressor state of Russia – and it must ensure that Ukraine has the tools to not only defeat it, but also come out of the conflict ready to build a functional state from ashes.

Failure to address the current challenges and Russia’s blatant violation of the rule of law could lead to further erosion of the international framework aimed at supporting peace and security for all nations. Discussions by Ukrainians with their partners will strengthen the incentive to continue collaborating and working towards a common goal – protection of democratic values and the global order. In addition, they may produce guidelines and enhance future dialogue on post-war nation- and state-building. As an organization focused on democracy and human rights, the Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development gathered up a panel of experienced specialists of international relations and law in Vilnius on the 19th of May 2023 for a discussion under Chatham House Rule on the challenges that will be important to address in the coming months and years, not just by Ukrainians, but also by its partners and allies.

**Ending the War as Priority Number 1**

Undoubtedly, the most pressing challenge for Ukraine currently is the physical war that started in late February of 2022 and does not currently have an end in sight. The experts of the working group were unanimous – Russia is a common enemy. The threat that the aggressor state poses is not just that of armed conflict, but also of destruction of common values, human rights, democracy and rule of law. The atrocities that the aggressors have committed on Ukraine’s soil are in violation to international humanitarian and criminal law.

Furthermore, the threat is not restricted to Ukraine alone, it spills over onto the wider international community. In order to address any challenge that is existent or is to arise after the war, the international community must first find a solution to defeat Russia militarily. Here, the role of international partners becomes crucial. The international community must maintain and even increase its support in diplomatic, medical and military aid to Ukraine. To achieve that, the higher authorities in the international arena must first be reminded of the vile consequences that Ukraine’s loss or the inconclusive end of the war would cause to the global economy, rule of law and democracy as we know it.

Though Russia’s victory is unlikely, it would be a loss to the whole international community, which would be shown the disastrous consequences of its absent or insufficient response to protect and support Ukrainian sovereignty. Meanwhile, it is estimated that if support to Ukraine eases and Russian resources run out, a stalemate would take place where neither side would be able to win and the West would be left to deal with an unpredictable and hostile Russia. This would create an uneasy and unstable environment for the whole of Europe as well as other regions. The economic repercussions would also be catastrophic, as economic recovery in the interests of the whole population would not be possible - Ukraine would fall into a “casino economy” that the worst foreign players would enter.

Provision of weapons and financial assistance, as well as strict policy on sanctions to Russia and its sponsor states are the most important actions that Ukraine’s partners can take right now to help put an end to the war the right way – with the victory of Ukraine. The victory of Ukraine would mean the gradual recovery of the country and implementation of reforms to create and strengthen its rule of law. Moreover, it would mean steps towards justice and reconciliation, which are absolutely crucial for further development of Ukraine and all involved actors. Surely, the end of the war with Ukraine’s victory would begin a healing process, and at the same time, a process of solving a number of other challenges.

**Ensuring Justice for All**

Russians have committed numerous crimes in Ukraine since 2014, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for forced expulsions of Ukrainians. Some analyses suggest that Russia is

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committing genocide, as Ukrainian children from orphanages have been transferred to Russian camps, thus erasing their national identity. It has also been evident that children that were abducted in 2014, who were around 12 or 13 years of age at the time, have been indoctrinated and came back to Ukraine in 2022 among Russian forces invading Ukraine. Human Rights Watch reports rape, murder and other acts of violence committed against captured Ukrainians,3 meanwhile, Russia has also violated Geneva Conventions having targeted civilian objects, disrespected humanitarian corridors and carried out other illegal acts. Indeed, the crimes committed against Ukrainians have been and continue to be heinous. Experts agree that every single perpetrator must be identified and properly tried. While important during wartime, seeking justice usually becomes a full-scale process after the guns fall silent, and it is one of the necessary components of the truth and reconciliation process. Nevertheless, the current situation in Ukraine might prove it to be a very challenging process for several reasons.

First and foremost, shortcomings in the internal judicial and law enforcement systems of Ukraine are posing a huge obstacle. Due to numerous corruption scandals and unsatisfying results of domestic trials, there is a major distrust in the domestic judicial system. For example, in May of 2023 news of a corruption case for the Chief of Ukraine’s Supreme Court broke out. Later, the case was expanded to a wider circle of judges who were also suspected of taking bribes.4 While some reforms have been taking place, corruption and lack of transparency in decision-making remain problematic. Because people cannot trust that judges and other officers are truly only working for the whole of society, victims are discouraged from approaching the justice system.

Those who do approach the authorities and inform them of crimes committed against them or their loved ones are often disappointed in the procedure. Most of the reported cases need to be investigated internally, which is a huge burden due to the system in Ukraine not having been fully reformed and the legislation still lacking harmonization with international criminal law. Ukraine lacks investigators, has limited resources and is overwhelmed by the number of cases appearing every day because of the war. This means that many cases remain unsolved and perpetrators are not brought to justice.

The solutions to this challenge are difficult to find. The position of a judge in Ukraine is already a prestigious one, considering that the judges earn around 20 times more than an average Ukrainian.5 This is a clear indicator that poor pay is not the real problem. The experts agree that there is a necessity for a change in staffing – people with integrity should take over such important positions, though empowering them to do so is a different issue. Another possible solution to the problem is a more common use of jury trials – the method would ensure that power is taken away from the judges and given to civil society.

Secondly, international efforts to bring justice to Ukraine have not yet been successful. Surely, the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) into alleged core international crimes committed in Ukraine, made up of seven states and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, is a promising attempt to assist in the matter.6 Investment is being made in

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databases and coordination. In addition a new center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression has now been set up in The Hague. But there are only limited numbers of trials in Ukraine, ICC arrest warrants are impossible to enforce if the subjects do not travel to ICC member states, and there is no international agreement on the nature and format for any additional international tribunal for Ukraine.

The experts of the working group were adamant that an international tribunal will only be able to function effectively if it is provided with sufficient resources. The goal is to identify and bring to accountability every single perpetrator, be it a soldier, a commander of armed forces, a government official or the president himself. Tribunals, both in Ukraine and internationally, are vital for education and therapy – informing people of the events that took place and hearing out victims leads to truth and reconciliation. However, a criminal tribunal can only be effective if it has financial and expert support and engagement – here, the need for a strong role of the international community is reiterated.

In terms of taking accountability, Ukrainian as well as international experts agree that Russia should also pay for all losses and damages of the war. Every single person should receive recognition for the losses and damages they experienced. Experts suggest that frozen assets may be used for this, however, their confiscation for reparations must be worked out legally first.

**Overcoming Internal Challenges**

Many agree that the aggression of Russia was a result of Ukrainian national identity having been reborn to reflect its closeness to the European Union and democratic states, moving away from the former Soviet legacy and pro-Russian politics. The civil society of Ukraine decided on its own that it wants to move towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration and has made great strides to demonstrate its dedication. The will to move towards EU and NATO memberships was also reflected in the constitution of Ukraine since its 2019 amendments. To reward the progress made by Ukraine, and at the same time to respond to the Russian invasion, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine be given candidate status in 2022, with the understanding that some necessary reforms must still be made internally for the country to actually qualify and enter the EU. Experts of the working group also identified several internal challenges that Ukraine must deal with (and must receive support in) to create building blocks of functioning rule of law and democracy.

First of all, one of the most emphasized internal challenges that experts agreed on was corruption and oligarchy. The abovementioned cases of judicial corruption are not the only ones that have been pulling Ukraine’s progress backward. Law enforcement, governmental agencies and businesses are all tainted by corruption. Even though many people who were suspected of or proved to have been taking bribes have been fired by the recent government, and judges have been brought to trial, the problem remains omnipresent. Meanwhile, oligarchs maintain their influence over governmental decision-making and determination of voter behavior. The businessmen either sponsor and financially support government officials and their projects, or control some of the largest and most influential media companies in the country.

Corruption and oligarchy are some of the most worrying issues for international partners, which is why they demand enhanced transparency in how the money and other resources they provided are being spent. Experts also emphasize the importance of bringing corrupt judges and government officials to justice, as well as building a sense of public service and a feeling of dignity and integrity in these fields of work. One possible solution to that is encouraging civil society leaders and young professionals to take part in politics as a challenge in itself, which is why some experts propose implementing a new mechanism that would ensure that doors are open also to those who do not have connections with established people, as well as a policy that would require to keep ‘injecting fresh blood’ into the system. It is also believed that involving civil society into the criminal investigation and prosecution processes might enable principles of transparency and service in the procedures. Support and resources for an independent media are also crucial, as it is one of the most important tools of transparency and democracy in any country. In terms of fighting oligarchy, the Antimonopoly Committee in Ukraine must be supported to enhance its effectiveness. Meanwhile, it is encouraged to maintain the sanctions that are put in place against some of the oligarchs even after the war, so people of power and wealth are not comfortable to hide and avoid accountability.

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Second, experts agree that when the guns fall silent, the complexities of property rights will become an important part of Ukraine’s internal challenges. Not only are the costs of reconstruction and recovery going to be immense, but the scale of the damage will also require an enhanced government capacity to process numerous cases of compensation of damages and restitution of rights. It is necessary to provide the government with advice and knowledge on how to establish a fast, transparent and just process to deal with this matter, which is why experts recommend establishing a series of workshops in cooperation with the EU to train government officials on this process.

Third, Ukraine maintains a political system that is based on personalized parties which threatens its further democratic development. In other words, Ukrainian voters usually rely on one main person of a political party to determine their choice in elections, and that one leader can then exert his preferences over the whole nation. The Fatherland Party (Batkivshchyna) was mostly known as Yuliya Timoshenko’s party, Party of Regions was known as Viktor Yanukovich’s party, and Servant of the People is, of course, known as Volodymir Zelensky’s party. Personalized politics can become a huge threat to democratic development of a state because it tends to polarize people as policy choices become reflective of the leader’s personal preferences rather than a broad-based discussion by multiple actors. Experts are unanimous – Ukraine should move away from personalized political parties and head toward a more broad-based system.

Last but not least, Ukraine is facing a potential crisis of freedom of press. The time of war requires strict measures taken by the leaders of the country under attack, however, president Zelensky’s decision to sign a bill that expands government control over media has been met with much criticism and is understood as a threat to press freedom and media pluralism in the country, also endangering society’s trust in the media and lack of transparency in informing the public. These can become major challenges after the war ends, as the media will have lost its credibility and rebuilding it will be complex. Free media is necessary to convey to the public not only local news, but also global developments as well as political changes and decisions. The media should not be controlled by the government, oligarchs or anyone else, as it plays a crucial role in recovery, truth and reconciliation, mobilization and transparency practices.

These internal challenges are highly complicated; however, they are necessary to overcome in order for Ukraine to keep moving toward true democracy and rule of law. No one is better equipped to deal with internal challenges in their own ways than the Ukrainian civil society. Ukrainians know the socio-historic context, they are fully aware of the structures of corruption, and they understand their own needs better than anyone from the outside. While international support is crucial, the international community and Ukraine must understand that there is no template on how to become a democracy and maintaining it. In fact keeping democracy strong and effective is a challenge for every state, the experts it stated, and a strong civil society and freedom of press are crucial for such vitality.

Conclusions

In our report we briefly overviewed the discussion of experts of law and international relations that took place on the 19th of May 2023. The experts touched upon the most important challenges that Ukraine is facing to enable victory, as well as obstacles that the country will need to overcome after the guns fall silent. The participants of the discussion emphasized the importance of ending the war as soon as possible, ensuring justice for all perpetrators, and assisting Ukraine in overcoming internal challenges, such as widespread corruption, oligarchy, personalized politics and lack of freedom of press.

The discussion was not an empty presentation of challenges – it was an informed dialogue between different specialists on possible solutions to the most pressing issues. A number of proposals and recommendations on potential mechanisms for further engagement of civil society and the international community as well as for the implementation of reforms to deal with shortcomings of rule of law were presented.

Undoubtedly, the road post-conflict will be a bumpy one, and Ukraine will need continuous support along the way. The international community must understand that we are all in this for the long-haul. This is the time for the international community to demonstrate its political courage and tenaciousness. The time to show strength and unity in defending common values. The time to fight for the freedom of Ukraine, as Ukraine is fighting for the freedom of the entire democratic world.
Session II: Reconstruction and Environment

The 13th Sakharov Conference’s panel on Reconstruction and Environment brought together scholars, historians, economic policy experts, and strategists to discuss the Ukrainian post-war recovery, strategies for reconstruction, and approaches toward rebuilding a greener and more sustainable Ukraine. The escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War resulted in the mass destruction of the civilian, administrative, and critical infrastructure while causing immense infrastructural and environmental damage and hindering international action on environmental protection. With the lasting hostilities, the ever-increasing need for Ukrainian reconstruction and green transitioning poses many questions and challenges. The proliferating global issues caused by the Russian military action resulted in increasing food security threats, complicated decarbonization efforts, and environmental vulnerability both in Ukraine and abroad thus revealing the pressing need for an established and well-coordinated plan on how to address the existing crisis effectively. Moreover, rebuilding a modernized, greener, and developed infrastructural and institutional base in Ukraine simultaneously requires defined and functional strategies. The expert discussion on the Reconstruction and Environment aimed to identify the main problem areas and explore the best practices and actionable insights for the Ukrainian reconstruction effort and the role of environmental components within.

Reconstruction: Problems and challenges

Problems

Despite the ongoing war, it was noticed that Ukraine is functioning better during the war than before, which generates optimism for post-war developments and reconstruction efforts. However, the process of Ukrainian recovery is hampered by a range of challenges stemming from economic, financial, political, structural, and social aspects. The ongoing hostilities were discussed as the greatest impediment to the reconstruction effort. The systematic shelling in Ukraine directly affects economic and financial initiatives thus hampering prospects for reconstruction and broadly affecting the climate of foreign investments. The reconstruction is estimated in billions of funds that will require careful financial planning as well as mobilizing domestic and international investments for the statistical recovery of Ukraine in financial and economic terms. However, it was also mentioned that in some areas reconstruction could and should already begin and not wait till the end of the war.

Ukrainian recovery undoubtedly requires the involvement of political structures in the financing of the reconstruction effort as well as determining the parties responsible for bearing the financial burden. Nevertheless, the scenario of a ceasefire without an absolute Ukrainian victory can be conditioned by the increased pressure of some international actors for normalizing relations with Russia and alleviating the sanctions thus posing a challenge to Ukrainian reconstruction since the role of Russia as the financial contributor to Ukraine’s recovery can be simultaneously questioned and reviewed. The issue of resources and funding for Ukrainian reconstruction remains significant and is exacerbated by the need for substantial and systematic financial support.

Moreover, the current military action in Ukraine and post-war recovery strategies foster a redirection of financial resources toward military spending, reconstruction projects, and social protection for the victims of war. The challenges and gaps in budget planning...
The national plan by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Recovery for example is focused on Ukrainian resilience such as humanitarian coordination, sanctions, and management regarding the Ukrainian reconstruction agenda. While there are efforts to establish a comprehensive reconstruction plan, the lack of coordination and resource allocation continues to be a significant issue. The coordination of the reconstruction is not yet established, and the agencies responsible for funding the reconstruction projects are centralized, leading to increased competition for external funding and hindering effective coordination.

Since Ukraine is still widely considered a corrupt country, it makes it challenging to attract international investments. The problem of corruption itself is seen as one of the biggest obstacles to Ukrainian recovery with more than 80% of the Ukrainian population considering it a significant hindrance to reconstruction efforts. Altogether, despite the efforts to develop anti-corruption infrastructure, the challenge of corruption is coupled with the extensive damage to infrastructure caused by the lasting military actions. The war resulted in mass damage to critical infrastructure including transportation networks, energy facilities, and communication systems. Moreover, issues related to transport and infrastructure, including the lack of highways, blocked ports, and destroyed roads, pose challenges to economic infrastructure and hinder connectivity between Ukraine and the EU respectively. Therefore, destruction and inefficiency of these elements hamper sustainable economic growth and efficient connectivity between Ukraine and international partners.

The challenge of corruption is coupled with the extensive damage to infrastructure caused by the lasting military actions. The war resulted in mass damage to critical infrastructure including transportation networks, energy facilities, and communication systems. Moreover, issues related to transport and infrastructure, including the lack of highways, blocked ports, and destroyed roads, pose challenges to economic infrastructure and hinder connectivity between Ukraine and the EU respectively. Therefore, destruction and inefficiency of these elements hamper sustainable economic growth and efficient connectivity between Ukraine and international partners.

Furthermore, the discourse underlined the gaps connected to coordination and resource management regarding the Ukrainian reconstruction agenda. While there are efforts focused on Ukrainian resilience such as humanitarian coordination, sanctions, and micro-financial support, the coordination of the reconstruction is not yet established. The national plan by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Recovery for example is considered a significant step for Ukrainian rebuilding initiatives. However, the lack of coordination between governmental and non-governmental regional and central authorities has a negative impact on the distribution of funding and resources. The disagreements and lack of coordination between regional and central authorities can lead to increased competition for external funding thus in turn disrupting and hindering a cohesive and collective approach to reconstruction. Additionally, it is crucial to have effective coordination mechanisms in place to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts. While the UN plays a role in coordinating humanitarian issues, it seems that more comprehensive coordination is needed. Thus, the lack of coordination mechanisms and competition among authorities may impede the progress of the overall reconstruction in Ukraine.

Another point highlighted by the discussion is the need for Ukrainian decentralization when talking about the increased fragmentation of central and regional entities. While there is a desire for decentralization, the reality may not fully reflect it. Attempts to establish strong state structures, similar to Bismarckian models, have been made in Eastern and Central Europe. However, conflicts and competition among ministries and government bodies can hinder effective coordination. Thus setting a clearinghouse for decentralization effort is yet another challenge for Ukrainian recovery. While the strategy for reconstruction is said to be centralized, the allocation of local budgets and decision-making autonomy at certain levels becomes increasingly important. A centralized decision-making and financial allocation mechanism may prove to be ineffective for Ukrainian recovery as it becomes challenging to prioritize the reconstruction of specific regions over others and tackle region-specific problems. In this regard, decentralization allows local authorities to have the capacity to implement regional projects and address the most urgent matters. On the one hand, although the subsidies that were previously accrued from the central government have been canceled, and the agencies became responsible for funding the reconstruction projects. The funding agencies largely lack the capacity and require internal reconstruction and reorganization that pose yet another challenge. Nevertheless, the decentralization policy is seen as one of the most crucial strategies for the efficient reconstruction of Ukraine as well as for Ukraine’s integration into the EU and adherence to its policies.

As a candidate for EU membership, Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction is politically determined by compliance with EU principles and policies. EU integration poses a range of political challenges such as conditioning from EU members like Germany, which emphasize the significance of internal reforms, including decentralization, deregulation, etc. in Ukraine. The risk of disagreement and discrepancy between internal EU and Ukrainian policies is evident. In terms of EU integration, Ukraine may require derogation in terms of environmental policies to allow time for aligning local needs with EU standards and alleviating the ecological consequences of the Russian invasion. Altogether, Ukraine is seen as a training ground for EU policies, but caution is advised in idealizing the EU and understanding the need for a well-thought-out plan.

The question is raised regarding the preference of the EU to cooperate with grant organizations rather than directly engaging with Ukrainian civil organizations. The
funding structure for Ukrainian reconstruction needs to involve Ukrainian civil society. The role and place of civil society in the recovery efforts are thus emphasized. Moreover, while a national reconstruction council exists it is not adequately coordinated with the needs of civil society. There is also a lack of trust between the government and civil society as well as an already-mentioned disconnect between international efforts and the engagement of Ukrainian civil society. Involving civil society directly in the reconstruction effort requires defining their route for influence and finding ways to include them at various stages. The engagement of civil society is vital, but concerns exist regarding the quality and capacity of civil society organizations. Nevertheless, cooperation between ministries and civil society organizations is crucial, and transparency is essential for successful collaboration. Moreover, business considerations, such as the availability of funding and human resources, also pose challenges.

Ukrainian reconstruction is often mistakenly viewed as a post-war strategy concentrating on mere recovery policies. One of the major problems in Ukraine is the excess of outdated infrastructure and systems that do not comply with EU concepts in the first place. The challenge lies in that Ukraine is in dire need of modernization and requires to take immediate action towards reconstruction in order to be able to meet the EU requirements, generate technological advancement, and alleviate economic and financial burdens. Nevertheless, Ukraine simultaneously faces a lack of active and competent institutions that would have a defined and clear visionary leadership and strategic expertise in modernization efforts. Determining who should be involved and how to ensure inclusivity and expertise thus remains the key concern.

Another impediment to reconstruction lies in the exacerbated demographic crisis. The war resulted in one of the biggest migration crises, expelling millions of Ukrainians from their homes. The question of how to encourage Ukrainian internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and migrants to return to Ukraine thus becomes essential for the Ukrainian recovery. The balancing of different needs and long-term planning requires analytics, sound strategies, and policy recommendations. Therefore the second part of the report will concentrate on generating possible solutions to the above-mentioned issues and challenges.

Solutions

To begin with, in order to address the most obvious challenge for the reconstruction such as systematic shelling and destruction of properties, Ukraine has to acquire a security umbrella. Security is a determinant factor for the reconstruction efforts. Of course, accession to NATO is the best option to restore territorial integrity and create a conducive environment for Ukrainian recovery. There is a call for a short path to NATO accession as it can reinforce processes and support necessary internal reforms in Ukraine. Moreover, apart from transatlantic integration, it is equally important to construct a joint vision of Russian and security architecture in Eastern Europe as it is a key to creating political unity and security in the region.

The unified vision of Ukraine and its partners is simultaneously important in achieving economic recovery. The dire need for reconstruction funds calls for the mobilizing of partner countries to contribute funds to the recovery of Ukraine. The possibility of doubling or tripling the GDP is conditioned by balancing the budget and achieving sustainable economic growth. One of the most effective ways to reach desired economic progression is to create an auspicious climate for foreign investments. This requires improving the business environment, implementing law enforcement reforms, and actively working on creating an attractive destination for investors. Coordination among Ukraine and its partners is crucial for Ukraine’s financial and economic recovery since the country is highly reliant on donor programs, international aid, and foreign investments. Facilitating a favorable business and investment climate along with developing human capital and formulating the international economic policy can enhance economic complexity and foster economic growth in Ukraine respectively.

Reconstruction effort simultaneously requires deregulation, primarily focused on terminating Soviet-era regulations to facilitate an economic breakthrough. Total deregulation is the fastest and cheapest way to improve the business environment and stimulate economic growth in Ukraine. It is highly important at this stage to secure sufficient funds and resources to establish an easy and clear taxation system and simplify the step-by-step implementation of various projects. Cleaning and modernizing the system by reforming legal acts and regulations is also crucial in the deregulation process. During times of war, there should be an increase in post-war redistribution, with 42% allocated to social needs. It is expected that military expenses will also increase, and measures need to be taken to accommodate the millions of people affected by the conflict and support their reintegration. Attracting investments and increasing productivity is vital for economic growth. Opening the Ukrainian labor market to foreign capital can contribute to increased productivity. Non-strategic factories can be offered to foreign investors to encourage more investments. Creating a favorable business and investment climate, along with developing human capital and formulating an international economic policy, can enhance Ukrainian economic development.

Moreover, facilitating more transparency in Ukraine’s political structures could potentially attract an even larger pool of investors. While not perfect, Ukraine has been developing its anti-corruption infrastructure. Currently, there are islands of
integrity within the country and certain legal frameworks are in place to deal with corruption. Coupled with legal reforms, judicial reforms are crucial for Ukraine and the establishment of an independent and effective judiciary is required to prosecute corrupt institutions and individuals as well as ensure transparency in the country. Moreover, in order to combat corruption more efficiently, Ukraine may implement technology-driven systems to enhance transparency and accountability.

Everaging technology is a unique chance to reconstruct and modernize Ukrainian infrastructure while also combating institutional corruption. Therefore digitalization and technological advancement could potentially contribute to a less corrupt environment while reducing possibilities for corruption and enhancing efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the country. Overall, judicial reforms, integration of technology as well as continued efforts to strengthen the current anti-corruption infrastructure in Ukraine are needed to combat corruption efficiently and create a safe environment for international investments. To address corruption, the Ukrainian government needs to recognize that it is rooted in the economic realities thus rethinking economic relations, decreasing centralization, and implementing progressive reforms. It is important to undertake the steps to ensure security for investors. Insurance policies, openness in the privatization process as well as tenders for customs can be additionally designed to provide financial security to investors.

The challenging geography and size of Ukraine reveal the need for modernized and restructured infrastructure as well as better transport connectivity. Addressing the infrastructure needs within Ukraine and improving connections with neighboring partner countries is highly important for successful reconstruction. The logistical aspects of the reconstruction effort would facilitate the needed economic growth and contribute to the increase of Ukrainian GDP as a whole.

The financial burden for the Ukrainian reconstruction has to be addressed and mitigated through multiple sources. Primarily, the role of the Russian opposition in compensating for damages in Ukraine as well as utilizing reparations and expropriations acquired from confiscated and frozen Russian assets have to be reviewed as the sources for Ukrainian financial recovery and reconstruction respectively. Moreover, the confiscated Russian funds, assets from the Russian national banks, and contributions from oligarchs are seen as crucial steps for financing Ukrainian economic recovery and infrastructural reconstruction.

The establishment of a coordination platform and a top-down approach to coordination is also necessary to ensure the efficient implementation of reconstruction projects. While there are efforts focused on microfinance support and resilience, there is a need for a more complex coordination plan that goes beyond these aspects and concentrates solely on the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine. The national plan by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Recovery is a considerable step; nevertheless, further efforts and coordination platforms are required. Nevertheless, there are several proposals for coordination platforms, such as those suggested by the EU, EBRD, and the G7. These platforms would involve national governments and target specific areas like sanctions, macro support, and military support. Targeted coordination is essential for survival and resilience in the aftermath of war.

Recovery and modernization also require a clear vision, goals, and adequate resources. The priority to assure efficient coordination and reconstruction respectively is to build a strong and functioning state with a clear structure and centralized strategy thus ensuring effective coordination and defragmentation of the entities. Additionally, decentralization and addressing disparities should be part of the overall strategy. It is important to establish rules and rights for all regions ensuring that decentralization does not result in separation from a central authority. Maintaining a strong central government while allocating local budgets and granting certain regional decision-making power could provide for the efficient implementation of regional projects.

In terms of financing a reconstruction project, the DREAM platform can be used as a channel for accessing funding for single regional projects meanwhile regional administrations should take responsibility for the project implementation. It is also important to address the inefficiencies of funding agencies and strengthen their capacity while ensuring effective coordination between the Ministry of Infrastructure, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry for Restoration, DREAM platform, PROZORRO, etc. In turn, the competition between the ministries has to be minimal and a clear executive power has to be established.

Additionally, regional development forums that would operate through regional administrations can be established. This could be implemented either through regional development at the local levels with the collective efforts of regional leaders and the
president or through a decentralization process allowing regional communities to become relatively self-sufficient. To facilitate funding for regional reconstruction projects, it is suggested to create a position on the local level that would be responsible for applying for funding through the DREAM platform. This strategy could help to address the disconnection and disagreements between regional and central authorities. Nevertheless, it is crucial to foster transparency in this process and avoid partiality in the allocation of funds.

EU integration and modernization initiatives are rudimentary to the reconstruction processes in Ukraine since it gives a chance to rebuild better, greener, and more efficient infrastructure while aligning with EU standards and requirements. Indeed Ukraine needs to be compliant with the EU requirements but certain derogations can be required, especially in terms of realizing green transformation and fulfilling the environmental standards of the EU. Nevertheless, there must be an understanding that certain standards might need more time to be fulfilled and implemented since Ukraine is facing an excessive amount of issues that have to be simultaneously addressed.

The involvement of civil society is equally crucial to the Ukrainian recovery and reconstruction effort. Civil society has to contribute to developing a plan of reconstruction while engaging in discussions and negotiations on this matter. Local stakeholders and communities should be engaged and decentralization is essential to focus expertise and decision-making at the local level. It is crucial to assist civil society in understanding the importance of the modernization process and its role within it. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the inclusivity while recognizing that Ukrainian society might differ from that of the EU.

The funding of the Ukrainian reconstruction effort needs to involve Ukrainian civil society. A triangle approach is proposed, involving the EU, Ukraine, and Ukrainian civil society, rather than a dichotomy between the EU and Ukraine. Fostering cooperation between various stakeholders is necessary for Ukrainian recovery. Civil society forums and the engagement of proactive and progressive businesses in the reconstruction effort can contribute to making Ukraine sustainable from the beginning of the war. To support civil society organizations, it is also crucial to establish a network of financial institutions that can provide funding. This network should focus on building institutional capacity through research, analysis, and expert networks. Additionally, civil society organizations play a vital role in providing ideas, thoughts, analysis, vision, and goals for the recovery process. Strengthening different coalitions within civil society can enhance their capacity, which can be further improved with increased investment. In terms of solutions, inclusivity should be prioritized from the beginning, and it is important to learn from successful models elsewhere. The involvement of both civil society and the government in decision-making is essential to avoid corruption and modernize outdated structures in Ukraine thus creating auspicious conditions for the reconstruction effort.

Modernization is considered fundamental to the Ukrainian recovery as it goes beyond destroyed properties and involves a local effort to modernize old institutional and infrastructural structures. Collaborating with experts can help to outline policies and strategies for modernizing Ukraine. There is a need for prompt action rather than post-war reconstruction. Taking action now to support modernization and reconstruction is crucial for addressing and averting future problems such as poverty, and economic turmoil. It is increasingly important to seek alternatives such as modular houses that can help initiate the rebuilding process without delay. By prioritizing modernization and approaching reconstruction now, Ukraine can reduce and alleviate the posed challenges as well as stimulate economic developments and advancements in times of war.

Nevertheless, it is also crucial to address the exacerbating situation related to the Ukrainian demographics. Projects aimed to return refugees, migrants, and IDPs to their homes must be supported and implemented. Moreover, programs for allocating social benefits and creating employment opportunities have to be reviewed as options to stimulate Ukrainian migrants to return to Ukraine and contribute to its economic development. Reviewing other alternatives to Ukrainian reconstruction such as setting up modular homes and rebuilding destroyed properties can simultaneously help to encourage Ukrainian IDPs and refugees to return to their homelands.
Environment: Problems and Solutions

Problems

The issue of sustainability and environmental considerations are not adequately addressed in the current reconstruction effort. The environmental aspect of reconstruction is crucial, and Ukraine will need to comply with international standards and regulations. Infrastructure for green initiatives will need to be developed, and while there are good ideas, the cost factor poses a challenge.

Economic success can create environmental pressures, and if Ukraine wants to rebuild in a green manner, it will require funding. Green funds may not be as business-friendly, and Ukraine, being at an early stage compared to Western nations, faces challenges in aligning its economy with environmental goals. Trade-offs are inevitable, and while building green can sometimes be cost-effective, green technology itself can be expensive, although costs are decreasing over time.

Overall, Ukrainian green transitioning and combating environmental challenges require coordinated and well-developed analytics on Ukraine’s energy potential, demining, and economic strategy. Economic capacity also plays a significant role in Ukrainian green development. Financial resources and investments are required to rebuild sustainable and innovative infrastructure. Therefore addressing the lack of funds and technologies is a primary concern for Ukrainian green conversion.

Solutions

To make reconstruction environmentally sustainable, a portion of the funding should be allocated to sustainability finance. Failure to do so could result in losing out on a significant market share. Using ecology taxation as leverage can be a potential approach to incentivize sustainable development. Fulfillment of Sustainable Development Goals after 2030 and the question of who will bear the financial burden also need to be considered. However, transparency remains key to ensuring the effective implementation of green initiatives.

Ukraine’s green transitioning should be integrated into the modernization process, including the rebuilding of renewables and hydrogen technologies. Ukrainian reconstruction objectives highlight the importance of reconstructing the energy system while focusing on greener alternatives such as solar and wind energy. Therefore the potential of utilizing renewable energy in Ukraine must be maximized. The Southern Ukrainian regions have prospects for producing solar energy and thus are suitable for renewable energy development. However, the issue of demining remains one of the largest threats to Ukrainian environmental protection thus requiring international assistance and investment.

Ukrainian green transitioning goes hand in hand with EU integration since Ukrainian accession to the EU is politically conditioned by its environmental policies. Ukraine thus has to acknowledge the importance of blue finance, sustainable finance, and the integration of environmental-friendly approaches into the reconstruction process, including the taxonomy and other aspects of green conditions that simultaneously need to be recognized and incorporated into the Ukrainian recovery initiatives. Embracing the trend of environmentally friendly practices in Ukraine will contribute to building back better, greener, and more efficient infrastructure while ensuring long-term sustainability and compliance with the EU requirements and objectives.

International cooperation and partnerships can play a significant role in addressing the lack of funds and technologies. Collaborative efforts with organizations, governments, and private sector entities can help mobilize resources, share knowledge and expertise, and promote technology transfer. Engaging in dialogues and seeking support from international bodies focused on sustainability and environmental preservation can further bolster Ukraine’s efforts.

Overall, a comprehensive and well-coordinated approach that addresses sustainability, environmental challenges, and economic capacity is necessary for Ukraine’s green transition. By prioritizing these factors and leveraging international partnerships, Ukraine can work towards a more sustainable and environmentally conscious future.
Conclusion

Overall, the discussion on Reconstruction and Environment highlighted the complexity of Ukrainian reconstruction efforts while emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to Ukrainian recovery.

The challenges faced by Ukrainian recovery are multi-faceted and require concentrated efforts and initiatives. Altogether it is evident that the largest problem areas of Ukrainian reconstruction are economic and financial recovery, corruption, logistics and connectivity with neighboring countries, finding the financial resources, coordination of the reconstruction effort and resource management, compliance with EU requirements, lack of involvement of civil society, outdated systems and structures, deteriorating demographics and green transitioning. Ultimately, the success of reconstruction efforts in Ukraine generally depends on effective coordination, inclusivity, transparency, and the involvement of all stakeholders, including civil society, government bodies, and local authorities.

Therefore, addressing posed challenges has to be facilitated by creating conditions for an economic breakthrough, implementing deregulations, fostering transparency and decentralization, concentrating on modernization and swift action, engaging and attracting foreign investments as well as integrating Ukrainian civil society in the rebuilding effort will be vital for successful and sustainable reconstruction in Ukraine.

Session III:
Trauma, Memory and Recovery

The consequences of Russian aggression in Ukraine have left deep wounds that will have lasting physical and psychological effects. Both military personnel and civilians have been severely impacted, requiring complex and specialized care to address their needs. The war has resulted in significant damage to the existing medical infrastructure in Ukraine, necessitating its restoration to provide essential healthcare services. Additionally, there is a pressing need for the renewal of the mental health system to offer long-term psychological support to the population.

The mental health system should be rebuilt and revitalized to meet the specific needs of individuals suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other long-term mental health outcomes. It is crucial to strike a balance in providing appropriately skilled mental healthcare while avoiding the medicalization of these outcomes. The aim should be to address the mental health needs of the affected population without creating additional problems or dependencies.

Furthermore, the memory of the war will undoubtedly impact Ukraine, a nation characterized by its multiethnic and multicultural composition. It is essential to approach the task of addressing the war’s memory in a way that avoids oversimplification and acknowledges the diverse perspectives on suffering. Everyone’s experience and perspective should be respected and considered, rather than grouping them into a singular narrative.

Coordinated efforts and collaboration will be key in the reconstruction of the medical and mental health systems in Ukraine. By focusing on specialized care, preventing the medicalization of mental health outcomes, and recognizing the multietnic nature of the nation, Ukraine can strive to provide comprehensive support and healing to its population. The goal is to create a future where the traumas of the past are addressed and processed effectively, fostering a society that is inclusive, understanding, and resilient.

Key Findings and Key Points of Discussion

• **Impact of trauma at different levels**

  Resilience is the most widespread response to the mass trauma. Trauma has impact at different – individual, family, community, societal – levels. Therefore, it is important to promote resilience at these various levels in Ukraine, to foster resilience and facilitate the process of healing and recovery.
At each of these levels, the negative, neutral, and positive outcomes of trauma could be distinguished. Mental health disorders including PTSD, distressful psychological reactions, and human suffering are negative consequences; resilience (understood as bouncing back) could be defined as a neutral outcome, and Adversity Activated Development (AAD) – as a positive outcome of trauma (Papadopulous, 2022). Strategies for fostering positive outcomes at each level must be defined and applied.

Special attention should be paid to the dimension of justice. Mental health recovery would be assisted with justice. The patience, perseverance, and confident action here are important. The process of addressing trauma related to mass violence is a long-term endeavor and achieving justice in political and public life is of a paramount importance. Mental health is inseparable from equity, this is why assuring equal access to social services, legal services, and mental health and psychosocial support to people in need is crucial.

The acknowledgement of harm at the individual, family, community, and societal levels and facilitation of proper grieving of losses and memorization strategies are important. The process of authentic mourning is more than just crying; it involves acknowledging, exploring, evaluating, and explaining what happened. This is why historical and political scientists have a special role here, especially in case of dealing with the past traumas. Remembering and symbolizing trauma are considered important aspects of the healing process. This could involve various means such as media coverages, museums where the history and experiences of trauma can be preserved and shared, as well as the involvement of artists, academicians and civil society in shaping narratives and creating spaces for collective remembrance and reflection.

In dealing with the collective trauma, active participation of writers, artists, academicians, civil society including media professionals and other key stakeholders is of a paramount importance. With all these means (justice, science, art, civil activism, etc.) societal healing not just recovery could be achieved. Overall, the collaboration between scientists, artists and civil society is essential in effectively dealing with trauma and facilitating healing and transformation.

While dealing with the war-related mass trauma attention should be paid to the diminishing harm caused by the ongoing hybrid war operations as well.

Acknowledgement of harm and suffering caused by the aggressor from the side of the bystander facilitates authentic mourning. Therefore, preventing the normalization of the ongoing war from the side of the international community is important. Attention to war should not wane, even when other disasters occur globally. Supporting non-governmental and non-profit organizations responding to societal needs and ensuring international recognition and support for the attacked country is important.

• Amplification of past inter-generational traumas

The Russian aggression, characterized by war crimes and intentional infliction of pain on Ukrainian society, provokes intergenerational trauma caused by the Soviet repressions and Holodomor. In response to this, Ukraine considers seeking justice as a crucial coping strategy. Justice is seen as a fundamental requirement to help the Ukrainian people cope with trauma. There is a strong sentiment among the population that it would be a great disappointment if Russia goes unpunished for its crimes.

Combining personal and collective memory is also a complex issue, as personal narrative (and trauma) may conflict with collective narrative (and trauma). This is why internal reconciliation within the society is also important step in dealing with collective trauma. Trauma’s intergenerational impact on memory emphasizes the importance of historical understanding in shaping contemporary politics and identity formation. Learning from other countries experiences, education, acknowledgment of past injuries, transparency, and finding a balance between individual and collective narratives/memories are essential.

• Disproportion between the mental health demand and supply

Soviet heritage of mental health care system in Ukraine involves out-of-dated psychiatric institutions, stigmatization, discrimination, and social exclusion faced by individuals with mental health problems, insufficient funding of the system, particularly with less than 3% of the health budget allocated to mental health care, inadequate funding for psychiatry and addiction treatment, and a lack of specialists needed for children & adolescents mental health care.
Considering the mass trauma experienced by Ukrainian society as a whole, including the displacement of millions of people, increased financial barriers, and the deterioration of mental health, it is evident that there is an urgent need to develop a contemporary mental health care infrastructure and introduce modern evidence-based approaches and methods.

According to the World Health Organization data from December 2022, the conflict has put approximately one in four Ukrainians at risk of mental disorders. This includes an increased prevalence of substance use and somatic problems, as well as a higher risk of PTSD and depression. Children of mothers with PTSD are also at an increased risk of mental health problems. Approximately 18 million people are in the risk group, including 1.1 million with severe and moderate mental health disorders that require specialized services. Before the war, there were 61 mental health clinics in Ukraine, of which 10% have been destroyed and 6 are beyond restoration.

Addressing these challenges and providing adequate mental health support and services to the affected population is crucial in the aftermath of the war. It requires investment in mental health infrastructure, resources, and trained professionals to meet the needs of individuals experiencing trauma and mental health difficulties.

• **Mental health-related lessons that the war taught**

The war in Ukraine has taught several important lessons that highlight the shortcomings and areas for improvement in the country’s systems and responses to emergency situations since 2014. Those lessons are:

1. **Lack of preparedness:** The Ukrainian state was not adequately prepared to respond quickly to the mental health and psychosocial emergency situations, highlighting the need for improved mental health and psychosocial emergency response mechanisms and systems. The war brought to light the lack of sufficient coverage and attention given to mental health issues in Ukraine. This highlights the importance of promoting and prioritizing mental health services, support, and resources to meet the needs of the affected population.

2. **Slow and insufficient changes:** The war exposed the slow and inadequate changes in the organization and functioning of various systems within Ukraine, including the mental health system. This highlights the importance of implementing timely and effective reforms to address the evolving needs of the population.

3. **Developing a social support system:** The experience gained from the war emphasizes the need to study and learn from it to develop a comprehensive social support system that can effectively address mental health and psychosocial issues and replace outdated mental health systems.

4. **Rehabilitation of military personnel:** The war highlighted the challenges and failures in rehabilitating military personnel who have experienced trauma. This underscores the need for specialized and comprehensive chain of care tailored to the specific needs of this at-risk population.

5. **Need for upgrading prison mental health system:** Addressing mental health needs requires recognizing the long-lasting effects of war on populations mental health, among other problems: mental distress, anxiety, possible violent behavior which might increase domestic and community violence and consequently – prison population. The prison system must efficiently address mental health needs of prisoners, and the prison mental health system in Ukraine needs rebuilding.

6. **Limited understanding of mental health and trauma:** The war revealed a limited understanding of mental health and trauma within Ukrainian society, further emphasizing the importance of promoting awareness, education, and training on mental health- and trauma-informed policies and practices in the different fields (e.g. pedagogy, social work, rehabilitation, management, etc.) to better support those affected.

7. **Development of a program of mobile mental health teams:** Lessons from the war have also demonstrated the value of mobile mental health services, which were organized since 2014 and have proven to be highly useful in 2022 as well. The implementation of online consultations and other innovative methods has become vital in the reformation of the mental health system, allowing for increased accessibility and flexibility in delivering mental health support.

8. **Piloting innovative services:** It is crucial to utilize data from the experiences of 2014 to determine the scale of emerging mental health needs in 2022 and develop appropriate innovative strategies and interventions to address them effectively. Research must accompany piloting of innovative services to collect evidence on their effectiveness. By learning from past experiences and leveraging innovative approaches, Ukraine can work towards building a more resilient and responsive mental health system to support its population in the aftermath of the war.
• **Children, Adolescents and Youth Mental Health need special attention**

Children, adolescents and youth mental health need special attention. The mental health and stress- and trauma-informed pedagogics needs to be developed in the country. Creating safe spaces for universal preventative interventions, involvement of mental health informed artists, such as animators and singers, as well as art therapists for children and adolescents in need can be highly beneficial. These people can play a vital role in providing emotional support and creative outlets for children who have experienced potentially traumatic experiences or suffer from trauma.

The issue of children, kindergartens, and schools is crucial. However, they often lack proper guidance and information about how they can assist children in dealing with the war-related experiences. Spreading knowledge about how children behave during times of war and providing education on the subject of mental health is essential to the teachers and parents. Children’s suffering may not always be apparent on the surface, and it is important to acknowledge their emotional struggles.

With the widespread use of social networks among youth, it becomes crucial to utilize social platforms, short educational videos to reach out to them and address their needs. When developing initiatives and programs, it is crucial to seek the opinions and input of youth. Their perspectives and experiences should be incorporated into the development process. By involving young people, their needs can be better understood, and initiatives can be tailored to effectively support them.

• **Need for assessment, evidence-based programs, quality assurance mechanisms and consistent chain of care**

Assessment is crucial at various levels in Ukraine’s mental health system. In the context of the volatile situation in Ukraine, conducting needs assessments at least every three months is crucial due to the evolving nature of the challenges faced. The focus of assessment has shifted over time, from considerations such as hospital closures and patient evacuations at the onset of the war to addressing issues like violence, loss of homes and income, and sexual acts of violence. Regular evaluation will enable tracking of progress and adaptation of strategies.

The Lancet Commission’s staged model of mental health care should be implied in Ukraine, paying attention not only to treatment, but also to mental health promotion and prevention of mental disorders. This is why mental health literacy projects should be implemented, based on the following four pillars: 1) Positive attitude towards Mental Health; 2) Knowledge and skills to obtain and maintain good mental health; 3) Understanding mental disorders and their treatment and 4) Ability to seek care effectively in case of need.

Besides that, trauma-informed non-specialized and trauma-focused specialized mental health services should be available/accessible for people in need, equipped with the evidence-based programs and methods. Rehabilitation and recovery infrastructure should be developed for those with treatment resistant conditions.

It is important to implement evidence-based programs. The WHO Self-Help+ program, initiated by the First Lady, has been launched and is being implemented for the entire population. Efforts are also being made to educate family doctors in Ukraine. However, there is a need for further programs and support, creation of modern multidisciplinary trauma-informed and trauma-focused services as well as a need to upgrade psychiatric services, to create chain of care to better serve different populations in need.

Education of work force plays a significant role in developing sound mental health and psychosocial care infrastructure, with webinars and training being utilized. However, it is important to go beyond training alone and ensure program supervision and support. Commitment to quality and annual strategies within educational programs is crucial.

Collaboration and coordination among organizations, including non-governmental organizations, clinics, and schools, is essential. Specialized services and evidence-based modular approaches should be employed to ensure quality and outcomes. The focus should be on fostering resilience and promoting access to mental health services without stigmatization, making them readily available to those in need.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

Based on the discussions and consensus reached during the panel and workshop between panelists and workshop participants, the following recommendations emerged for addressing the various issues related to trauma, mental health awareness, and post-war recovery in Ukraine:
Immediate Actions:

- Establish regular practice of quarterly needs assessment
- Develop a Mobile Teams Support System
- Pilot multidisciplinary trauma-informed and trauma-focused services (both online and face-to-face) and accompany service provision by effectiveness studies
- Establishing small community mental health centers and veterans' assistance centers
- Enhance mental health literacy among general population and professional groups
- Implement mental health promotional and preventative programs (e.g. WHO Self Help Plus) among general population to foster resilience
- Support the documentation cases of war crimes for assuring informational support for process of justice
- Prioritize the restoration of justice alongside peace, recognizing that justice is essential for lasting peace
- Support the documentation of resilience stories to foster resilience within the population
- Support societal mourning and memorization via different means including symbolization via art
- Establish a system oversight mechanism to ensure accountability and quality in mental health services
- Tailor interventions based on the specific needs at different levels: individual, social, and collective
- Respond systematically to innovations in the healthcare system to enhance mental health services
- Foster interdisciplinary meetings to generate innovative approaches and collaborations

Post-War Recovery:

- Sustain trauma-informed policies, strategies, management and practices (including trauma-informed care) and support beyond the war, acknowledging that healing is ongoing process
- Invest in long-term mental health infrastructure and capacity-building, including training and retraining mental health professionals
- Address the challenges of brain drain by incentivizing the return and retention of mental health professionals
- Emphasize memorization and symbolization as integral parts of the healing process, recognizing diverse perspectives and experiences
- Engage artists and cultural initiatives to contribute to trauma transformation and healing through creative means
- Conduct comprehensive investigations of the war’s events, facilitating truth-telling, remembrance, and accountability

These recommendations acknowledge the dynamic and unpredictable nature of war and emphasize the need for flexibility and ongoing assessment to respond to evolving circumstances. Given the volatile situation in Ukraine, it is crucial to regularly update and adapt the recommendations to address emerging needs and challenges. Interdisciplinary meetings and collaborations should be planned and organized to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and expertise among professionals from various fields. These meetings can serve as platforms for discussing and updating recommendations based on the latest developments, research findings, and firsthand experiences.

Additionally, it is important to create research-based mechanisms for continuous feedback and evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the implemented strategies and interventions. This will help identify areas that require adjustment or improvement and ensure that the recommendations remain relevant and responsive to the evolving needs of the population affected by the war.

By regularly revisiting and updating the recommendations, Ukraine can maintain a proactive approach to addressing trauma, promoting mental health awareness, ensuring proper memorization of war events, and fostering post-war recovery.
Session IV: National Reconciliation (Societal integration)

The fourth and last panel of the Conference was devoted to the discussion of the problematic issue of national reconciliation. Academics, journalists and experts gathered together to debate on the most urgent aspects of the question, sharing their own knowledge and valuable experience on the field. The members of the panel strongly felt that the title of the panel should have been “societal integration”, as reconciliation is a term that is rather used in highly divided societies, e.g. Rwanda, South Africa, and Bosnia. The panel felt that such division is nonexistent in Ukraine notwithstanding the fact that social cohesion will be an issue after the war that will need much attention.

Public conference panel discussion

The war brought devastation and suffering in all of Ukraine, and once the conflict will be over, it is of the utmost importance that they will not leave the place only to hatred and a rule of revenge: the rule of law and hope in a new and peaceful future, based on cooperation, harmony and understanding within the country is the only way to build a lasting peace, as the conference title recite. This is true especially for the territories that endured the Russian occupation, starting from Crimea. As a consequence of the large-scale invasion, people had to face different experience: while soldiers were fighting at the front, some people stayed but the majority of civilians had to flee their houses, even abroad in some cases, some were deported to Russia or to occupied territories and were forced to require a Russian passport. Many issues will rise after the end of conflicts, in relation to collaborators – were they real or imaginary – as well as to the status of languages, and other questions. A successful process of societal integration is aimed not only at finding solutions to these problems, but especially at the creation of opportunities for the population to take active part in the process and become the foundation stone of a reconciled, integrated and open society.

Public presentations

The issues that the societal integration will have to deal with find their roots in situations and events that are already taking place now. For this reason, it is important to acknowledge the present conditions of Ukraine, in order to introduce the topic of societal integration and this was the main aim of some of the public presentations.

Thanks to the data collected by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, it emerged clearly, how some regional differences were pre-existing, while new issues arose with the war. The main argument concerns the attitude of various groups of population (refugees, IDPs, veterans, simple citizens, etc…) towards potentially problematic categories: among these, we can mention ethnic Russians, collaborators but also the Russians who opposed Putin regime, the Ukrainians, forced to take Russian passports, and others, who had close contact with the occupiers. The attitude of the population varies greatly from one region to the other, and the government has not taken a clear stand yet.

The specific issue of deported children was also raised. According to the investigative report of journalists, hundreds of children, deported to Russia, are often taken away from families with situation of hardship and social exclusion. The future with Russian families to some represents an illusion of improvement, but these facts point out clearly how the Ukrainian government should not only work for the return of these children (and along them the many others who were abducted to Russia), but it should also focus on an effective system of social reintegration of children and youth within the country in order to offer everyone a respectable future.

Among the social issues facing the country, there is the growth of far-right groups, and potential nationalist movements of young people, who are not experienced in politics (and have lost a big part of the politically-experienced leadership), but have developed their views throughout the war. Although it is not overly concerning at this moment, the phenomenon should be monitored, also in relation to the possible future connections to the right-wing parties of other western countries. The attitude of parts of the population could become aggressive, as it has already happened with people who fled to e.g. Poland and were treated as traitors.
Potential societal tensions should be taken care of in order to keep the society strong and resilient to hybrid warfare, which could pick on vulnerabilities to hamper the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation. An integrated society is essential for the attractivity to investors and collaborators, eventually to be involved in the physical reconstruction of the country, and not only. In this regard, it should however be emphasized that the attitude of western countries must be open to help but not patronizing or condescending, as important as it will be.

Today Ukraine is brought together by the effort of war, but problematic issues will potentially arise: from the language problems to the controversial historical memory, to the consensus on joining the EU and NATO. The premises within today’s society leave space for optimism, which is essential to look ahead and conceive a project for societal integration.

Closed Working Group sessions

While on the first day, the experts had to deliver their speeches to an audience, on the second day the participants were not only knowledge holders but also recipients: by listening to the others and sharing their opinions, they actively engaged in a thought-provoking and constructive discussion. The meeting was organized as follows: during the morning session, after an introductory summary of the previous discussion, the moderator offered the opportunity to every participant to freely express thoughts and reflections on the topic in a brainstorming fashion to identify main problems. This debate was followed by an afternoon session that aimed at systematizing the most salient arguments previously evoked, and at elaborating a list of problems and recommendations.

Morning session

A common framework

Before the debate, the group discussed the definition of the topic and established a few common points. It was noted that the term “national reconciliation” implied the necessity to establish a form of ‘national unity’ in a country that presents severe political divisions. While not ignoring problematic issues, it is important to note that the Ukrainian society does not suffer from severe cleavages, it is sufficiently integrated, and is not “on the verge of civil war” as the Russian propaganda would like to have it. The situation is far from that in the Balkans in the 1990s or in Rwanda after 1996. All the participants agreed on the fact that it is dangerous to overstate the divisions characterizing Ukraine, especially while the war is still ongoing. It was agreed that the discussion and the recommendations must be based not on political considerations, but on expertise, focusing on positive solutions for the enhancement and consolidation of the societal integration after the war. A positive, open and constructive attitude should be held steadily to enhance productive and healthy dialogue, based on the specific case of the Ukrainian society. Recommendations must stem from the practical point of view, and the role of experts is precisely that of mediating and creating the connection between the political level and the social level of reconciliation and integration.

The focus is on the Ukrainian society: specific groups and categories, which risk exclusion, and the ones which could be involved in the process of re-integration, are to be clearly identified along with their motivations and needs. The traumatic experiences of the war must not only be recognized, but mechanisms should be devised to come to terms with them. All the experts agreed that a strategy of societal integration cannot be imposed in a top-down approach, it was stressed that the public opinion and the fundamental needs of the Ukrainian society itself should be taken into account in the first place; finally, it was acknowledged that the international intervention should be very limited.
The question was raised, when would be the right time to start talking about reconciliation, whether it is not too soon to discuss this topic during the war, when the outcome is not certain and so many aspects depend directly on it. Indeed, some participants admitted that reconciliation should not be at the top of the agenda today; however, already from this moment, it is important to discuss possible problems – some of which are already starting to arise to a certain extent – and solutions, identifying priorities and fields of action.

Social groups

A significant part of the discussion was devoted to the identification of social groups that must be considered in the process of societal integration.

An important group that should be taken into account is that of the people living in the occupied territories, who might wonder whether they should remain in Ukraine or rather leave for Russia. In this regard, it must be highlighted that Ukraine cannot afford losing population. In connection to this argument, it was also highlighted that even refugees who started new lives in Europe or elsewhere should be reattracted to their motherland when the conflict is over; because the human resources will be indispensable to rebuild the country.

Finally, the problem of internally displaced people should be duly considered: too often it is overlooked, but it will create tensions in the sectors of healthcare, labor and occupation market, education, etc. Indeed, these problems are related to governance and fall within the responsibility of social services, however, it was acknowledged that it is important to identify the IDPs as a social group which will need to be taken into account in the societal integration efforts.

Justice as foundation for societal integration after war

Sometimes there may be the risk of confusing national reconciliation with other practices that will be put in place especially after the war, therefore it is useful to specify what does not pertain directly to the scope of reconciliation or where there can be overlaps with other disciplines. For example, even though the words “justice” or “war crimes” were mentioned several times in the course of the discussion, it should be reckoned that the judicial system is responsible for the management of such questions which, however, are indirectly connected to the topic of societal integration: in other words, justice does not have a function of national reconciliation, but still represents a preliminary condition, necessary but not sufficient. Currently it would appear that the SBU is deciding who collaborated and who didn’t and imposing tax-related and other punitive measures, e.g. on people who continued to run their businesses in occupied areas. The role of the courts needs to be stressed vis a vis any other actors who may wish to impose sanctions on alleged collaborators (not only elements in the general public). In any case, as it was stated previously, societal integration, completes and complements the judicial action.

Various examples were mentioned: a recurring element of the discussion, for instance, was the concept of collaboration, since it causes a partial overlap between disciplines. First of all, it was stated that a clear definition of “collaborator” is missing and should be provided without delay; even though treating the problem would fall within the scope of justice and rule of law, at a social level, it must be ensured that no form of self-justice is enacted by the population. Therefore, experts on national reconciliation could help in defining collaboration firstly, especially in controversial cases such as those of parents forced to give their children away to Russian families or teachers forced to use alternative schoolbooks in the occupied zones; however, once again, after establishing what cases should be brought to judicial court, and strengthening the system (that already now is overwhelmed by the workload), it is crucial to focus also on the societal level and on the collective attitude toward this problem. People must be sensibilized and educated not to practice any form of self-justice and revenge.

With respect to the topic of justice and collaboration, the need to find a model for inspiration emerged: one of the ideas was to look at the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation established in South Africa in 1995 (even though some participants expressed some reservations with respect to it as the situation in Ukraine is hardly comparable), given the humanistic traits that the Commission represented and considering the fact that two different moral authorities were involved, since it was religiously-inspired. A considerable aspect is the extended media dimension and coverage that the Commission could count on, which actually led the society to a sort of collective catharsis, which could be replicated in Ukraine. Not only media coverage was crucial, but also the choice of the spokesperson: while in the case of South Africa the members of the Church played a fundamental role, in contemporary Ukraine this could
Current situation of social dialogue

In addition to considering the subjects and major premises for societal reconciliation, it is also relevant to acknowledge the current situation with respect to dialogue within the public space. There was a broad consensus among the experts that the war has the potential to enhance and deepen cleavages within the public space, and give way to “hate oriented” arguments instead of the focus on peace and justice. This emerges especially in social media and online space, where episodes of hate speech are an everyday occurrence and are all too often accepted or justified, to the point that this incitement to hatred is not even perceived as a real social problem. This is already evident in several situations: there are testimonies of people being accused by others of engaging in unethical or inappropriate behavior, for example, engaging in dialogue with the “enemies”, i.e. the Russians, even if they are in opposition to the Kremlin; or refusing to ban the Russian culture. Strong nationalism, sometimes based on the ideologization of far-right movements (related also to the heroic performance of some, e.g. Azov Battalion), may become radicalized and problematic after the war. The problem is that “hate speech” has no definition in the national legislation, and there is not much sensitization of the public to the world-wide problem of the “cancel culture”. The task for the strategy of the societal integration is also to control various polarizing narratives, and to promote a healthy and hate-free space for dialogue.

For these reasons, it is important to bring the country together to discuss these public issues, providing large space for a healthy and hate-free debate. It could be useful to remember that Volodymir Zelensky played his electoral campaign on the very idea of “national unity” and “peace”. There was a broad consensus among the experts that the war has a potential to enhance and deepen cleavages within the public space, and give way to “hate oriented” arguments instead of the focus on peace and justice. This emerges especially in social media and online space, where episodes of hate speech are an everyday occurrence and are all too often accepted or justified, to the point that this incitement to hatred is not even perceived as a real social problem. This is already evident in several situations: there are testimonies of people being accused by others of engaging in unethical or inappropriate behavior, for example, engaging in dialogue with the “enemies”, i.e. the Russians, even if they are in opposition to the Kremlin; or refusing to ban the Russian culture. Strong nationalism, sometimes based on the ideologization of far-right movements (related also to the heroic performance of some, e.g. Azov Battalion), may become radicalized and problematic after the war. The problem is that “hate speech” has no definition in the national legislation, and there is not much sensitization of the public to the world-wide problem of the “cancel culture”. The task for the strategy of the societal integration is also to control various polarizing narratives, and to promote a healthy and hate-free space for dialogue.

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Afternoon session

The afternoon session was devoted to the summary of all points that the previous discussion touched upon and the systematization of the main arguments. Firstly, a list of groups and categories that ought to be actively involved in the process of societal integration were identified; secondly, the main problems were listed, and lastly, recommendations and suggestions of possible solutions were drawn up.

Main actors

The subjects to which strategies of societal integration will be relevant, are various and may potentially encounter different problems:

- IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons): more than 6 million people left their homes, and found shelter in refugee camps or other temporary accommodations within the country; they live in conditions of great discomfort and uncertainty, especially with regards to health, education and employment.
- Returnees: about 7 million people had the opportunity and decided to go abroad; hopefully, many of them will decide to return and their reintegration in the society might be possibly hindered by the presence of resentful citizens who endured the horrors of war in their own country. There is also an unclear number of Ukrainian citizens, and especially minors, abducted to Russia, who may return at the end of the war.
- Russians living in Ukraine: some of them never shared the official view of Putin’s regime, some may have agreed with it, but both categories may be interested in remaining in the country where they have always lived.
- Ukrainians that remained in the occupied regions and accepted Russian passports.
- Soldiers who survived the war and will need to be reintegrated in the society, and soldiers (and not only) who might seek privileges or in some cases personal revenge once the conflict is over.

A separate mention needs to be done with respect to the actors who will assist the societal integration. The Ukrainian leaders will of course be at the core of the integration efforts of the Ukrainian society: not only the government but also moral and civic leaders. Both political and grassroots organizations - representing the sphere of politics and decision making, as well as representing the civil society and the population (NGOs, religious organization, etc...) - should be equally involved. A special responsibility should be devolved to the local and municipal level: decentralization in Ukraine seems to be working already; it should be strengthened and empowered in the task of societal integration.

Bearing in mind the relevance of societal integration, it is of course in the interest of Europe and all Western countries, that should have the rebuilding of Ukraine and
the consolidation of the Ukrainian society in their agenda, expressing their will and availability to help, without pushing or assuming a paternalistic attitude. The process must be owned by the Ukrainians themselves.

Main questions to be addressed

Below, the main questions that constitute the process of reconciliation will be listed and briefly illustrated.

1. **Definitions**: temporal and spatial dimensions for the societal integration must be clarified: not only the most convenient time of planning and action should be considered, but it should also be kept in mind that the de-occupied territories will present a different and harshest situation than the rest of Ukraine, so the strategies must be set accordingly.

2. **Justice**: the system, that is currently overwhelmed by the workload should be upgraded, and possibly assisted from the outside, to face the increase of judicial cases to be dealt with. Clarification is needed about what crimes deserve to be taken to the Court and which shall not (for example, regarding the different level of involvement and collaboration with the Russian enemy); clear definitions of "collaboration" and "hate speech" (as an example) should be established. A strong sensitisation campaign should come along to eradicate possible ideas of self-justice.

3. **Social reintegration**: returnees must be reinserted in the society and specific attention should be paid to their background stories, according to the group they belong to (mostly mentioned in the previous paragraphs).

4. **Social sensitisation**: once the conflict comes to an end, it will be necessary to deal with the ethnic Russians, those who consider themselves as Ukrainian citizens, those who opposed the Kremlin, and also those who did not. The attitude to be assumed in front of them will be crucial for the success of a peaceful society.

5. **Status of the Russian language**: while the law already covers this matter and regulates the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, it is necessary to address the behavioral aspect within society. It is difficult to talk about an actual "law enforcement" in the case of spoken languages, but it is certainly possible to talk about sensitisation and education, in order to have a population that is respectful of spoken languages, free of ideological meaning. The question could be also seen as a need to raise awareness with respect to the issue of proud patriotism as opposed to toxic nationalism. These steps are crucial in the path toward the construction of a nation that can have at the same time civic and ethnic roots.

6. **Digital dimensions**: nowadays, the digital dimension of dialogue cannot be overlooked. The role of social media must be acknowledged in shaping the public opinion and especially the attitude of society toward various issues. The growing level of hate speech (online and consequently in the society) hinders the respectful and constructive dialogue that is necessary for a consolidated and strong society.

Recommendations and steps forward

First of all the importance of a clear **legal framework** must be stressed. The rule of law and an equitable attribution of justice, with a strong commitment to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Ukrainian citizens, must be the basis for societal integration. For the specific purpose, the legislature may need to be updated and integrated, and the capacity of the legal system enhanced.

In the same way, the **governance** in the sphere of social matters (healthcare, jobs, benefits...) as well as the management of the resources (infrastructure, soil, water, etc...) will need a boost. In this regard, the decentralization of governance proved to be effective in many other matters: local government could be entrusted with the management of these matters with a coordination at the national level.

As far as **communication** is concerned, the action should cover two different directions. On the one hand, there is a need for a unifying national narrative that is inclusive and honest, based on a good understanding of history, and openness to the peaceful future. This could be structured through museums and other public spaces specifically related to the Ukrainian history and culture, but also through common spaces for debate, accessible for the whole population. The narrative proposed by the government and other moral leaders of opinion should have a homogeneous character, sending a positive message that reflects a constructive attitude even toward the most controversial groups, which cannot be simply accused of being problematic, but must be given a chance to integrate the society. Secondly, a concrete action against hate speech is needed: legal
Regulation would be a useful tool to create a safe (online and offline) environment, also tackling the problem of radicalization.

Coming to terms with the aftermath of war is not a process that happens fast, but needs a generation to be accomplished and needs an active educational program towards the population, both children and adults. Different projects could be implemented, also taking inspiration from other countries. Among the suggested solutions, following the Scandinavian style, it was proposed to prepare classes for adults to get civic education, develop a more mature and independent thought so that it’s more difficult to be manipulated by any sort of propaganda, but especially helping the citizens acquire active agency in their lives and in that of their communities. Along formal education, it is fundamental to also plan informal education: grassroots organization and NGOs should be directly involved in projects such as exchange camps or recurring and systematic meetings of different societal groups: one possibility could be to adapt at the national level the model of French-German reconciliation, when young people were called to carry out socially useful projects, related to reconstruction, in the other country, in cooperation with local communities. An interesting and a rather successful example of societal integration on a national scale was set up in Estonia, where the children from Russian-speaking and Estonian-speaking towns, like Narva and Tartu, were invited to spend exchange time with the families outside their regions and get to know the respective communities.

Whichever may be the form of incitement to societal cohesion, it is fundamental that it comprises both formal and informal education, so that active participation of civil society is ensured.

For the coordination and continuous development of the strategies for societal integration an ad hoc civic Commission, legitimated by the government could be created. Similar to what happened in South Africa, with the exception that the moral authorities would be more adequate to the Ukrainian context: there is the need of moral leaders, that could represent with credibility the unity of the country and could bring together diverse people. Rather than political or religious authorities, the best characters could be found among writers or artists or other non-divisive figures that can take responsibility for representing and spreading the message of social cohesion.

Conclusion

During the 13th Sakharov Conference, in the panel dedicated to the matter of societal integration experts presented different aspects of the topic that were reconsidered and further discussed during the closed session. The present chapter aimed at presenting the main points that emerged during the debate, and identified the main actors, problems and possible solutions. It underlined that the process would entail a common effort of the Ukrainian population with the primary need to transform the current patriotic feelings into lasting unity, choosing the most adequate narratives that carry a message of inclusivity and openness. The idea is not to have a new narrative imposed by the government or the Western partners, but to build it together and from the bottom, thanks to the active participation of citizens and civil society organizations.

However, the core point that ought to be stressed is that the process of societal integration is represented by a long and sometimes tortuous path: at least two generations will be involved in the realization of this project, and it will be up to the future generations to maintain the results achieved previously, because peace and cohesion are never achieved once and for all, but needs to be continuously actively preserved.
Annex 1

Main Conclusions of the
REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE ALL-UKRAINIAN SURVEY
conducted for the
ANDREI SAKHAROV RESEARCH CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC
DEVELOPMENT
February 2023

INFORMATION ABOUT THE SURVEY

The All-Ukrainian survey was conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2023, commissioned by Andrei Sakharov Research Centre for Democratic Development. The survey was conducted as part of a regular KIIS Omnibus. The main stages of the survey included the programming of the questionnaire (the OCA for CATI software was used), generation of mobile phone numbers, conducting interviews with respondents, quality control of the work done, preparation of the final data array, statistical weighting, preparation of the analytical report.

The survey was conducted by the CATI-method (computer-assisted telephone interview). According to the KIIS survey conducted in July 2021 by face-to-face interviews based on a random sample, 96% of adult residents of Ukraine had personal mobile phones. To conduct the all-Ukrainian survey, mobile phone numbers for all major mobile operators of Ukraine were randomly generated at the initial stage. The share of generated numbers per mobile operator was approximately proportional to the share of mobile numbers per mobile operator in general (according to KIIS surveys). To eliminate invalid numbers from the generated database, an “invisible” SMS message was sent to the generated numbers. Then the interviewers called the generated numbers and invited the respondents who answered the call to take part in the survey. The survey was conducted only with respondents aged 18 years and older and only with those who lived in the territory controlled by Ukraine on February 23, 2022. Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were not controlled by Ukraine before February 24, 2022, were not included in the sample, but residents of territories occupied by Russia after February 24, 2022 were included in the sample. Residents of Ukraine who left the country after February 24, 2022 were not interviewed. The interview was conducted in Ukrainian or Russian at the respondent’s choice.

After conducting the planned number of productive (complete) interviews, the distribution of respondents in the sample by macro-region of residence (West, Center, South, East - see details below), type of settlement (urban or rural), gender and age was compared with official statistical sources. The respondent in the interview reported his place of residence until February 24, 2022, as well as his current (at the time of the interview) place of residence. We used the place of residence until February 24, 2022 for further proceedings. The distribution of the entire adult population by macro-regions and type of settlement was determined on the basis of data from the Central Election Commission on the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections (by the number of registered voters). The gender and age structure was determined according to the data of the State Statistics Service as of January 1, 2021. To bring the sample structure in line with the structure of the population of Ukraine as a whole, special statistical weights were constructed. In addition, these weights take into account the different probability of getting different respondents into the sample (depending on the number of different mobile numbers that a respondent has).

The composition of the macro-regions: the Western macro-region – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Transcarpathian, Khmelnitsky, Chernivtsi regions; Central macro-region – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr; Kiev, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv
regions, Kiev; Southern macroregion – Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odessa regions; Eastern macroregion – Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkiv regions.

The field stage of the study lasted from February 14 to February 22, 2023. 2002 interviews were conducted.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of the all-Ukrainian sample of 2002 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) does not exceed:

- 2.4% for indicators close to 50%,
- 2.1% for indicators close to 25 or 75%,
- 1.5% for indicators close to 10 or 90%,
- 1.1% for indicators close to 5 or 95%.

In the report below, some data are given in the context of the macroregion and the type of settlement. For the calculations, we used the macroregion and the type of settlement where the respondents lived until February 24, 2022. In the case of respondents with different income levels, the categories mean the following: “very low” level means households that do not have enough money even for food; “low” – households which have enough money for food, but no longer have enough for clothes; “middle” – households which have enough money for food, and for clothes, but not enough to purchase some expensive things (TV, etc.); “high” – households which can buy some expensive things or can afford everything. Also in the report, for convenience, the answer “no opinion” means respondents who could not or refused to answer the questionnaire question.

In addition, for general understanding of the specifics of conducting surveys under conditions of war, we recommend reading the presentation of the President of KIIS, Prof. V. Paniotto, which was prepared for the conference “The Future of Social Research in Russia and Ukraine” (Delmenhorst, Germany, September 2022).

MAIN SURVEY RESULTS

CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF THE POPULATION

- The majority of respondents – 60% – are inclined to the option that the civil rights of Ukrainian citizens who continued to live in the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbass after 2014, should be restored only after exams/tests. Almost half as many respondents (34%) are of the opinion that it is necessary to restore all their civil rights as citizens of Ukraine without exams/tests;
- Only 12% of respondents believe that persons who arrived to the occupied territories after 2014 should simply obtain Ukrainian citizenship without additional conditions. But the tough solution to the issue – deportation – is supported by 31%. Most of the respondents – 51% – believe that it is possible to allow them to live in Ukraine as non-citizens with subsequent citizenship after fulfilling all the conditions.

CRIMEA

- Restoring control over all territories except for Crimea and leaving Crimea under Russian control (without official recognition) together with postponing the issue for the future is supported by 31% of respondents, 63% do not support it (this is a conditional scenario of “postponing the issue for the future”);
- Higher (41%) is the support for the conditional scenario of “UN protectorate”, when Crimea receives a special status and is not controlled by either Russia or Ukraine, although against it – 52%;
- In the case of the conditional scenario “returning Crimea, but giving up reparations”, we see only 24% support with 69% of those who are against it.

LANGUAGE ISSUES

- 93% of respondents believe that all citizens of Ukraine should know the Ukrainian language;
- 47% believe that languages should be protected for all national minorities, and another 35% support the protection of all minorities except for the Russian one.

We also draw your attention to the fact that for some demographic categories there is an “intersection”: for example, younger respondents are more affluent and educated. This should be taken into account when interpreting the results presented in the context of individual socio-demographic categories. You can see in more detail such “intersections” (as well as errors for individual categories) in Appendix A.

8 Challenges of surveys in Ukraine under conditions of war //
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

- 93% of respondents primarily blame Russia, although there are different opinions – who exactly is guilty in Russia. Thus, 35% consider the entire leadership of Russia to be guilty, and 24% blame personally V. Putin. Another 20% consider the entire Russian people to be guilty. Also, 12% speak about the whole society, except for individual citizens who have taken an anti-war position. 2% consider the Russian society, except for the opposition, to be guilty. At the same time, 2% of respondents primarily blame the West, 1% blame Ukraine itself;

- Even after the war, according to 77% of respondents, Russia will not cease to be a threat to Ukraine. 18% believe that it will no longer be a threat;

- If we talk about future relations, 57% are in favor of maximum political isolation of Russia, another 30% are in favor of neutral relations with certain restrictions. Only 9% want to see equal neighborly relations;

- 74% of respondents would like certain changes in Russia after the military defeat. Among them, the most – 40% – would like to divide Russia into several independent states. 23% would like to change the political regime to a democratic one, along with denazification and demilitarization of Russia. Another 12% simply want to change the political regime to a democratic one without denazification, demilitarization, etc.

SYMBOLS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE PUBLIC SPACE

- The majority of respondents – 73% – support the elimination of symbols of Russian culture from the public space of Ukraine. 23% of respondents are against it.

RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE AFTER THE VICTORY

- The absolute majority of respondents (80%) believe that the current leadership of Ukraine will adhere to the basic rules of democratic governance after the victory. Only 15% do not think so. In general, these indicators are consistent with a high level of trust / approval of the actions of the authorities, which are recorded after the invasion;

- At the same time, respondents are less confident that there are no threats to press freedom. Thus, 54% believe that after the victory there will be no such threat, but 39% consider the threat real;

- 83% of respondents agree that corruption is the main threat to the country’s recovery. Only 14% do not think so;

- Respondents’ opinions regarding the role of veterans after the victory were divided. Slightly more than half of the respondents (54%) believe that they should take part in the political process on an equal basis with other citizens. At the same time, 41% are in favor of granting them certain privileges.
Annex 2

PROGRAM

Thursday, May 18

08.30-09.00  Registration

09.00-10.00  Opening session

09.00-09.10  Marius Janukonis (LT). Director Strategic Management and Analysis Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania; former Ambassador to Ukraine

09.10-09.20  Emine Dzheppar (UA). Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

09.20-09.25  Myroslav Marynovich (UA). Prorector Catholic University Lviv, founding member Ukrainian Helsinki Group, former political prisoner

09.25-09.30  Sarunas Liekis (LT). Dean, faculty of Political Science and Diplomatic Studies, Vytautas Magnus University

09.30-09.40  Robert van Voren (LT/NL). Executive Director, Andrei Sakharov Research Center and Chief Executive, Federation Global Initiative on Psychiatry

09.40-09.45  Welcome to the hub at Shevchenko University in Kyiv
Moderator: Valerii Pekar (UA)

09.45-09.55  Keynote address: Timothy Garton Ash (UK). Professor of European Studies in the University of Oxford

09.55-11.25  Session I: Democracy and the rule of law
Moderator: Janet Anderson (UK/NL)
Reporter: Neringa Galianskyte (LT)
Speakers: Olga Aivazovska (UA), Brian Bonner (USA/UA), Jeppe Kofod (DK), James Sherr (UK/EST), Tetiana Pechonchyk (UA), Dainius Zalimas (LT)

11.25-11.45  Coffee break

11.45-12.10  Keynote address: Anna-Carin Krokstade
Deputy Head of the Ukraine Division in the European External Action Service

12.10-13.40  Session II: Reconstruction and Environment
Moderator: James Nixey (UK)
Reporter: Anhelina Kharuk (UA)
Speakers: Łukasz Adamski (PL), Andrii Dligach (UA), Eduard Klein (D), Kyrilo Kryvolap (UA), Robert Serry (UA/NL), Kataryna Wolczuk (UK)

13.40-14.55  Lunch

14.55-15.05  Feedback from the Shevchenko University hub on sessions I and II
Moderator: Valerii Pekar (UA)

15.05-15.20  Lesya Kharchenko - Clip on the Veteran Theatre in Kyiv

15.20-16.40  Session III: Trauma, memory and recovery
Moderator: Jana Javakhishvili (GEO)
Reporter: Maka Berulava (GEO)
Speakers: Marnie Howlett (UK), Oleksandra Matviichuk (UA), Irina Pinchuk (UA), Miiš Řezník (CZ), Robert van Voren (LT/UA)

16.40-17.00  Coffee break

17.00-18.30  Session IV: National reconciliation
Moderator: Emilija Pundžiūtė-Gallois
Reporter: Letizia Santhia (IT)
Speakers: Janet Gunn (UK); Rebecca Harms (D), Yaroslav Hrytsak (UA), Adrien Nonjon (F), Volodymyr Paniotto (UA), Petras Vaitiekūnas (LT), Fleur de Weerd (NL)

18.30-18.40  Feedback from the Shevchenko University hub on sessions III and IV
Moderator: Valerii Pekar (UA)

18.40-18.50  Closing
Appendix 3

SPEAKERS

Łukasz Adamski (PL)
Polish historian, publicist, expert on Eastern Europe, deputy director of the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Center.

Olga Aivazovska (UA)
Head of the Board of the Civil Network OPORA NGO

Brian Bonner (USA)
Senior editor for Geopolitical Intelligence Services and former editor-in-chief of the Kyiv Post

Andrii Dligach (UA)
Head of Advanter Group, Doctor of Economics, strategist, futurologist and visionary; founder of the Board business community, co-founder of the Center for Economic Recovery, SingularityU Kyiv, FreeGen, Investudio. Investor and ideologist of ecosystems and technology startups.

Timothy Garton Ash (UK)
British historian, author and commentator. He is Professor of European Studies at Oxford University. Most of his work has been concerned with the contemporary history of Europe, with a special focus on Central and Eastern Europe.

Mridula Ghosh (UA)
Board Chair at East European Development Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine

Janet Gunn (UK)
former research analyst in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office specializing on the USSR and Central Europe.

Rebecca Harms (D)
German politician who served as Member of the European Parliament from 2004 until 2019. She is a member of the Alliance ‘90/The Greens, part of the European Green Party. From 2010 until 2016 she served as president of The Greens-European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament.

Dr. Marnie Howlett (UK)
Departmental Lecturer in Russian and East European Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University Oxford

Yaroslav Hrytsak (UA)
Ukrainian historian, Doctor of Historical Sciences and professor of the Ukrainian Catholic University. Director of the Institute for Historical Studies of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.

Marius Janukonis (LT)
Director Strategic Management and Analysis Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania; former Ambassador to Ukraine

Myroslav Marynovich (UA)
Prorector Catholic University Lviv, founding member Ukrainian Helsinki Group, former political prisoner

Oleksandra Matviichuk (UA)
Ukrainian human rights lawyer and head of the non-profit organization Centre for Civil Liberties, one of the recipients of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize

Eduard Klein (D)
Since 2018 editor of Ukraine-Analysen and research fellow at the Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen.

Jeppe Kofod (DK)
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Member of the Folketing (Danish Parliament)

Anna-Carin Krokstade (S)
Deputy Head of the Ukraine Division in the European External Action Service

Kirill Krivolap (UA)
With more than 15 years of experience in public administration and private sector, Kirill is a Partner of the international consulting company CIVITTA and one of the founders of Ukrainian NGO “Center for economic recovery”. The latter became the platform for making the National economic strategy of Ukraine till 2030 and played an important role in preparing the URC22 at Lugano and the governmental Recovery plan for Ukraine. Mr. Krivolap is also a volunteering Advisor to the Prime-minister of Ukraine since 2020.

Sarunas Liekis (LT)
Dean, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomatic Studies, Vytautas Magnus University
Adrien Nonjon (F)
Adrien Nonjon is a doctoral student in history at the European Eurasia Research Center of the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations in Paris. He is also an associate researcher for the IERES program at George Washington University where he studies the Ukrainian far right.

Volodymyr Paniotto (UA)
Ukrainian sociologist, doctor of philosophical sciences, Director General of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, professor at the Sociology Department of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

Valerii Pekar (UA)
Co-founder of “The New Country” Civic Platform which unites experts working on reforms in Ukraine. He was a Member of the National Reforms Council (2014-2016) and Advisor to several ministers of economic development and trade (2014-2016). Mr. Pekar is a member of the Board of Directors of the Global Association of the Exhibition Industry (UFI).

Tetiana Pechonchyk (UA)
Director, ZMINA

Irina Pinchuk (UA)
Professor of Psychiatry at the Shevchenko University, Kyiv, Ukraine

Miloš Řezník (CZ)
Czech historian and director of the German Historical Institute Warsaw

Robert Serry (NL/UA)
Former Ambassador of The Netherlands to Ukraine, former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, President of the foundation Open Doors Ukraine (ODU), involved in early reconstruction activities in Ukraine

James Sherr (UK/EST)
Senior Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the International Centre for Defence & Security in Tallinn

Petras Vaitiekunas (LT)
Lithuanian politician was foreign minister of Lithuania from 2006 to 2008 and ambassador to both Latvia and Ukraine. Petras Vaitiekunas was a signatory to the Lithuanian declaration of independence in 1990 and a member of the Lithuanian Supreme Council from 1990 to 1992.

Dainius Zalimas (LT)
Dean of the Law Faculty of Vytautas Magnus University and Member of the European Commission “Democracy through Law” (Venice Commission) and Former President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania

Fleur de Weerd (NL)
Author and Ukraine expert, journalist working at De Volkskrant in The Netherlands

Kataryna Wolczuk (UK)
Professor at the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES) School of Government, University of Birmingham

Robert van Voren (LT/NL)
Professor of Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at Vytautas Magnus University and Chief Executive of the Federation Global Initiative on Psychiatry
MODERATORS AND REPORTERS

Session I: Democracy and the rule of law

**Moderator:** Janet Anderson (UK) is a journalist and podcast host specialized in accountability processes for international crimes. She provides support and training to fellow journalists navigating The Hague’s legal and human rights institutions.  
**Reporter:** Neringa Galisanskyte (LT)

Session II: Reconstruction and Environment

**Moderator:** James Nixey (UK) is Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, London  
**Reporter:** Anhelina Kharchuk (UA)

Session III: Trauma, memory and recovery

**Moderator:** Jana Javakhishvili (GEO) – Professor at Ilia State University, Tbilisi (Georgia) and Past President of the European Society for Traumatic Stress Studies  
**Reporter:** Maka Berulava (GEO)

Session IV: National reconciliation

**Moderator:** Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois (F/LT) is currently a research fellow at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, and an associated doctor at the Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI) at Sciences Po Paris, as well as Centre d’Études et de Recherches de Sciences Administratives et Politiques (CERSA) at Paris Panthéon-Assas.  
**Reporter:** Letizia Santhia (IT)

Annex 4

ADDITIONAL EXPERTS FOR THE WORKING GROUPS

Democracy and the Rule of Law

Jacky Bax (NL) – Former Program Manager, Ministry of Education  
Luuk Bouwers (NL) – Netherlands Embassy Vilnius  
Vladimir Jarmolenko (LT) – Former Ambassador to Romania  
Kateryna Latysh (UA) – Barrister (Member of Ukrainian National Bar Association), Associate Professor  
Tetiana Pechonchyk (UA) – Director, ZMINA

Reconstruction and Environment

Dovile Juodkaite (LT) – President, Lithuanian Disability Forum  
Dmytro Lyvch (UA) – Economist with many years of professional experience in public policy, sustainable development, budgetary processes, regional development, data analytics. He is Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine and Chief Operating Officer at the Centre for Economic Recovery.  
Arja Makkonen (FIN) – Ambassador of Finland to Lithuania  
Luc Vancraen (B) – Belgian entrepreneur working in Ukraine

Trauma, memory and recovery

Karine Balian (NL) – Program manager Ukraine, Stichting Vluchteling  
Hartmut Berger (D) – Professor of Psychiatry  
Monique Brinks (NL) – Project leader Exhibitions and Innovations, National Military Museum Soesterberg  
Martynas Marcinkevicius (LT) – Director, Vilnius Mental Health Center  
Goran Mijaljica (HR/S) – Psychiatrist and trauma specialist  
Daiva Price (LT) – Memory expert, Lecturer Vytautas Magnus University  
Peter Winkler (CZ) – Director, National Institute for Mental Health (Czech Republic)  
Kateryna Yasko (UA) – organizational psychologist, trainer in Nonviolent Communication

National Reconciliation

Eric Brassem (NL) – Journalist “Trouw” daily newspaper  
Vytautas Buciunas (UA) – Integral Master Coach™, leadership development consultant  
Anne Dastakian (F) – Journalist French Radio (France)  
Tatyana Dergach (UA) – Chief psychiatric specialist, Ukrainian Penitentiary System
The 13th International Sakharov Conference, organized by the Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development, focused on post-war Ukraine. Held on May 18-19, 2023, the conference aimed to address the challenges Ukraine will face in the aftermath of the war.

The first day of the conference, May 18, featured a public conference that centered on the reconstruction of Ukraine once the war will be over. The discussions aimed to identify the key areas that required attention, including rebuilding infrastructure, combating corruption, integrating the population of the occupied territories, delivering justice to all war victims and addressing mental health and psychosocial needs of war affected populations, especially those who suffer of war-related traumatic experiences. Academics, practitioners and other experts examined these issues in-depth, sharing their insights and proposing potential solutions.

On May 19, the second day of the conference, experts participated in closed working groups, focusing on specific aspects and challenges that Ukraine would encounter after the war. These working groups delved into the complexities of post-war recovery, considering topics such as trauma, memory, and reconciliation. The assembled academics, practitioners and other experts engaged in detailed discussions on how Ukraine should address past injustices and create a future where the war-related traumatic experiences are acknowledged and appropriately addressed at different (social, political, psychosocial, etc.) levels.

The discussions at both the public conference and the closed working groups aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges Ukraine would face in the post-war period and ways addressing these challenges in efficient ways. By exploring various issues related to infrastructure, corruption, reintegration, justice, trauma, and memory, the conference sought to contribute valuable insights and recommendations for Ukraine’s recovery process. The goal was to help Ukraine develop strategies and approaches that would enable the country to confront the past, heal its wounds in present, and build a more prosperous and inclusive future implying the “building back better” principle.

\[1\] The summary of the study is added to this report. The English, Ukrainian and Russian versions can be found on the website of the Sakharov Center: https://www.sakharovcenter-vdu.eu/assets/files/a5-report-en.pdf